Arbitration in Technology Disputes – GAR
11 November 2022
Technology is fundamentally shifting the way in which individuals, businesses and governments interact across sectors. The landscape is ripe for tech disputes, particularly in three key areas: post-M&A, long-term commercial collaborations and international investment protection. Arbitration is – rightfully – a prime forum for resolving such disputes. Tech arbitrations are, however, complex and raise a number of difficult practical and strategic issues, which we explore in this article.
Why does ‘tech disputes’ warrant its own chapter in the 2023 European Arbitration Review? The answer lies in a combination of three basic truths about society, disputes and arbitration, respectively.
First, technology (spanning AI, advanced robotics, data analytics to the internet of things (IoT)) is fundamentally shifting the way that individuals, businesses and governments interact with one another.[1] At the corporate level, tech M&A deal value and volume continue to dominate in 2022, including in the EMEA region.[2] Tech-driven joint ventures (JVs) and other collaborative agreements have also become a prominent feature of corporate strategy across a number of sectors.[3] At the governmental level, tech is raising novel questions about policymaking and challenging the boundaries between commercial activities and government regulations.[4] This is true especially in the European Union, which even more than any other major jurisdiction, is currently adopting and proposing significant new regulations in the tech space, altering the legal landscape for intermediary services such as platforms and marketplaces, the use of artificial intelligence and the commercialisation of data.[5] The European Union’s regulatory ambitions have and will result in an increasingly regulated environment, heightened compliance requirements and greater legal risks for tech companies operating in the European Union.
Second, wherever there is rapid change increasing complexity and significant uncertainties, there will be disputes. Thus, it is of no surprise that across all stakeholder levels, tech disputes are becoming more prevalent. In recent years, commercial tech disputes across the globe and, in particular, in Europe, have made headlines, ranging from the telecommunications and IT sectors to the med-tech space,[6] with many more such arbitrations staying out of the public eye.[7] Moreover, the proportion of tech disputes at ICSID appears to have doubled in 2022 compared to three years ago.[8]
Third, and relatedly, arbitration is in principle well suited to resolve tech disputes.[9] Arbitration promises to offer not only heightened confidentiality prized by tech companies, but also broad international enforceability, neutral and expert decision-making and increased efficiency.[10]
The interface between technology and arbitration can be analysed in great depth from many different angles – far more than could be adequately addressed in a brief survey review such as this one. We therefore do not aim for completeness or exhaustiveness, and refrain entirely from addressing fascinating topics such as the use of technology in arbitration, blockchain ADR[11] and the question of which IP rights may be non-arbitrable in some jurisdictions. Instead, we focus on the key trends, issues and challenges for the tech industry moving forward and consider the use of international arbitration as a preferred means of dispute resolution[12] in three key areas: first, tech M&A disputes; second, disputes arising in the context of commercial collaborations,[13] with distinguishable features from tech M&A disputes; and third, investor–state disputes centred around technology as the protected investment.
The tech industry encompasses a wide range of sub-industries, ranging from the earlier electronics and IT sectors to newer-age companies that rely heavily on intangible assets such as software, algorithms, AI-powered systems and data.[14]
Historically, tech disputes usually arose out of cornerstone agreements like research and development, licence or distribution and sales agreements (ie, agreements about the creation, protection or sale of technology).[15] It was (and is) common to see disputes over missed milestones, quality of service, payment obligations, breach of licences or exit terms.
More recently, however, tech-related M&A deals and related disputes have significantly increased.[16] The year 2021 was record-breaking in M&A and, although there was some decline in the M&A market in the first half of 2022, tech remains a growth driver and continues to be a relatively hot and seller-friendly market.[17] The EMEA region has experienced a particularly high level of deal activity in the tech sector in 2021 and the first half of 2022.[18] Moreover, we see that in contrast to earlier times in Europe, raising post-M&A arbitration claims is becoming the norm rather than the exception[19] and is no longer perceived to be a last-resort measure. In some cases, these arbitrations may even be seen as an acceptable mechanism to achieve a post-closing price adjustment.
Combine this with the unprecedented level of commercial and legal changes in the tech industry and we can expect more disputes arising throughout the cycle of tech-related M&A transactions, ranging from early-stage investments post-closing to initial public offerings.[20]
This expected rise of M&A disputes raises the question of whether parties can rely on arbitration as a proper means to resolve such disputes. In our experience, this is generally the case, as arbitration offers important advantages at various stages:
Meanwhile, parties should also bear in mind some tech-specific caveats to the suitability of arbitration, especially:
In our experience, the following issues stand at the heart of many tech M&A arbitrations.
First, there are difficulties associated with the valuation of the (complex) business models in tech, particularly given the competitive and fast-changing nature of the market and today’s seller-driven hot market. High valuations – but often with significant contingent payment components – are common fodder for disappointment by one side or the other. Moreover, the value of tech companies depends heavily on the assumptions that they can establish and maintain a profitable business model and their competitive edge over time.[27] If, however, a new competitor with superior technology abruptly enters the market or another significant adverse external event occurs, this can completely negate earlier planning assumptions in an M&A deal. The valuation forming the basis for the purchase price may then prove to be significantly incorrect if it fails to take into account such risks. This increases the risk of disputes under several heads, in particular for breaches of warranties, fraudulent misrepresentations, culpa in contrahendo (fault in conclusion of a contract) and in relation to earn-out provisions.[28]
Second, buyers may also face unique challenges conducting due diligence on tech businesses. More than other sectors, tech businesses often rely on ‘intangible assets’ such as patents, trademarks, copyrights or trade secrets. Assessing intangible assets is no easy task, even under the best of circumstances, let alone under the tight deal time frames frequently observed in the recent sellers market. In contrast to a physical asset such as a machine that can be inspected, the assessment (and valuation) of the validity of IP rights and their ownership is much more challenging – and in some cases, simply not fully possible (eg, with respect to trade secrets). Furthermore, tech is also a people business. From a deal perspective, in particular, the risk of departing key employees and onboarding key employees and the related risk of misappropriation of trade secrets needs to be considered in the transaction documents and might lead to disputes over breach of (IP) warranties or the valuation disputes described above.
Third, there can often be a significant disparity in sophistication and bargaining power between the parties. This applies most prominently in transactions where an established player is buying a start-up. But this can also be true even for transactions between two mature commercial entities, given sellers’ recent penchants for instituting tightly managed auction processes with limited room for buyers’ diligence or contractual protection. As mentioned before, this can lead to disappointed expectations and increase the likelihood for disputes and claims for misrepresentation.
A broad range of potential issues may trigger a tech-related M&A dispute, and it is usually not possible for either party to succeed in insulating itself against all material risks.[29] Parties are, therefore, well advised to anticipate from the beginning of a transaction that they could end up in a dispute down the road and act accordingly at every stage. In our experience, in particular the following key takeaways should be considered:
Aside from increased tech-driven M&A activity, we also observe a noticeable uptake of commercial collaborations between companies in the tech sector.[30]
Pressure to develop innovative solutions and reduce go-to-market times have incentivised businesses to look more frequently for partners with complementary and specialised capabilities to drive forward specific projects.[31] An illustrative example is the automotive industry, which is in the midst of a fundamental digital transformation: most OEMs and their suppliers now work together with software providers, battery producers and start-ups to develop solutions for self-driving and electric vehicles, charging or mobility-as-a-service solutions.[32] Similarly, in various parts of the world, urban city planners and construction companies are partnering up with tech outfits to create ‘smart cities’ that work more efficiently and intelligently.[33] In the IoT space, the global market looks bullish, with companies across different sectors transforming their businesses towards more connected, data- and software-driven digital operating models.[34]
Such commercial collaborations are different from M&A transactions in a fundamental way: they are typically entered into for a longer term, with the parties establishing a symbiotic relationship and sharing the common goal of having the collaboration succeed. In comparison, commercial parties in an M&A context are usually engaging in a one-off transaction and typically have (at least partially) opposed interests. Despite this conceptual difference, arbitration offers the same benefits of specialised knowledge and expertise, as well as heightened confidentiality protections adapted for the commercial tech environment. However, commercial collaborations also raise a number of unique challenges and novel issues.
The potential for disputes occurring in a commercial collaboration is enormous. While the issues that can give rise to conflicts are manifold, in our experience, they most commonly arise in relation to the following general topics:
Against this backdrop, it may – at first blush – be surprising that, statistically speaking, arbitrations arising in connection with commercial collaborations have thus been relatively rare.[39] In our view, the explanation is twofold. First, unlike in an M&A scenario, collaboration-type disputes typically arise when the collaboration is still in full pursuit – with mutual dependencies still in place. Arbitration is, thus, perceived as a means of last resort, an action one would pursue only when the termination of the partnership is unavoidable.[40] Most parties will file a claim only when all other options (eg, discussions in steering committees, mediation, expert determination and negotiations between C-level management) have not been fruitful – and collaboration agreements are often designed accordingly. Second, as noted above, the age of commercial collaborations is just beginning, and the time horizon for these collaborations is long. Thus, we believe it reasonable to expect that the recent trend towards more and bigger tech collaborations will result in a range of disputes – including some very complex and significant ones – going to arbitration in the years to come.
In light of the nature of issues highlighted above, we have compiled some key issues to consider for businesses entering into a commercial collaboration:
One of the defining questions of our time is how to regulate tech in a way that both fosters technological innovation and ensures that such innovation fairly benefits society as a whole.[41] Tech today is thus at the core of government policymaking, bringing into question regulations spanning free speech, citizens’ privacy, defence, economic security to public health and safety.
Governments are moving to regulate tech, and foreign tech investors, in a variety of ways. European countries are banning Huawei from participating in 5G networks over national security allegations.[42] The US is advocating for tech companies to ban TikTok over privacy and security concerns.[43] In light of its war on Ukraine, Russia has also banned some social media companies to combat ‘fake news’ and ‘foreign interferences’.[44] Indonesia and Pakistan are imposing licensing and data sharing requirements.[45] Following a Colombian court’s finding on competition law violations, Uber is exiting the market altogether.[46]
Faced with increasing government activism, companies are starting to turn to the investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) regime. Investment agreements provide for a range of protections, in essence against arbitrary and unlawful interferences by the host state.[47] When an investor is of the view that the host state has violated these protections, it can bring a direct claim against the host state before an international arbitral tribunal. Such is the ISDS’s advantage in allowing the investor to seek recourse against the host state outside of its national courts.
In the same examples cited above, Huawei has filed ICSID claims against Sweden over the 5G ban,[48] and Uber is also looking to bring claims against Colombia over the ban of its ride-sharing app.[49] Other examples of recently initiated cases in the tech space include PCCW’s claims against Saudi Arabia under the China–Saudi Arabia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) over the cancellation of its telecoms operating licence,[50] Digicel’s claim against Papua New Guinea over additional taxes on telecom firms,[51] L1bero Partners’ claims against Mexico under the North American FTA (NAFTA) and the Italy–Mexico BIT over regulations affecting the use of its ride-sharing app,[52] and Neustar’s ICSID case against Colombia in taking over its management of an internet domain.[53] Not only have we arrived at the new era of ISDS-tech disputes, but these examples also show that there are effectively no limits to the factual scenarios in which these claims may arise.
Given the increasingly complex regulatory environment, ISDSs will play an important (and likely controversial) role in determining the boundaries between investment protection and the host states’ right to regulate. As with the numerous examples mentioned, arbitral tribunals will be asked to grapple with difficult questions raised by the cross-cutting use of tech today and its intersections with core policy issues such as security, privacy and even free speech. However, as we observe below, while ISDS provides a general framework for tech companies to safeguard their foreign investments in the host state, the exact contours of these protections in relation to tech companies and their assets are, in some important respects, still to be determined.
Most investment treaties provide for a wide definition of ‘investment’ that is broad enough to encompass various forms of tech and tech-related resources. Certain treaties expressly protect IP rights in various forms,[54] including those that do not typically provide that an ‘investment’ may be of ‘every kind’.[55] Under this broad definition, physical tangible assets, such as hardware, and intangible assets, such as operating licences and IP rights, constitute protected tech investments.
However, in some areas, investment treaties continue to fall behind tech developments. Data, the ‘new oil’ of the digital economy,[56] is one such prominent example of a gap in treaties provisions. Most treaties were concluded in the 1990s, pre-dating the advent of such new technologies,[57] and have not been updated to explicitly address the question of whether ‘data’ can be an investment. The issue is whether data can be treated as an IP right or an intangible asset, and therefore qualify as a protected investment. This again raises difficult issues associated with the nature of data and whether it is capable of giving rise to rights. The position is far from settled,[58] with some countries, including the United Kingdom, now considering legislative reforms to specify the qualifying criteria for data as an asset, notably requiring the quality of a rivalrous good.[59] In contrast, European regulations such as the Regulation on the free flow of non-personal data and the proposed Data Act adopt the opposite presumption of the ‘free movement of data’ and data as a non-rivalrous good.[60] Clarifications on the status of data are important and long overdue in Europe, particularly in light of the increasing number of related EU regulations.[61] In other words, watch this space.
Against this backdrop, it is important for tech companies to be aware of the substantive protections offered for their investments, notably: (1) against wrongful expropriation; (2) fair and equitable treatment; and (3) full protection and security.[62] However, the scope and limits of these protections are in flux with new types of tech assets, changing jurisprudence and state practices in investment agreements. There are, thus, many interesting questions, which to date remain unanswered.
It is well-established that host states may only lawfully expropriate the property of foreign investors if done in a non-discriminatory manner, for a public purpose, in line with due process and with just compensation.[63] In the tech context, the classic expropriation could be a direct taking of a physical asset such as a tech company’s hardware or its brick-and-mortar operations by a host state.[64] Additionally, other intangible assets, such as licences and IP rights, may also be expropriated.[65]
However, some difficulties arise when we apply the test for indirect expropriation to current challenges faced by tech companies. In today’s regulatory environment, social media companies appear to be particularly affected, with bans over their operations and software applications[66] and compulsory data sharing requirements.[67] Turning to each of these factual scenarios:
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard protects an investor’s legitimate expectations of the regulatory environment and prevents unlawful government interference. This is a particularly effective tool as it speaks to the tech companies’ legitimate expectation that the regulatory environment will not change significantly to undermine the value of their investments over time. Out of the six active ISDS disputes in the tech industry, at least four have alleged a breach of the FET standard and in a variety of factual scenarios,[70] including alleged irregularities in the public tender processes,[71] the termination of an existing concession,[72] a failure to comply with agreed obligations to facilitate the operation of the investment[73] and government actions requiring telecommunication companies to cease support to the tech company.[74] These permutations speak to the versatility of the FET standard, which may be useful for tech companies when challenging a variety of regulations that impact their investments.
However, given the fast-changing nature of tech, it is questionable when and if investors may have a legitimate expectation to a stable regulatory environment.[75] In new-age tech industries such as software, data and blockchain where much is still in flux, states would likely argue that there can be no legitimate expectations of any regulatory stability and that governments cannot be constrained from legislating to protect key national interests. Moreover, more states are seeking to restrict the protections afforded by the FET standard, including through newer investment agreements in an effort to take back regulatory control, such as with India’s removal of the FET clause in its 2016 Model BIT,[76] and clarifications under the NAFTA and ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, linking the content of the FET clause to the customary international law standard.[77]
Full protection and security (FPS) serves as a diligence obligation on host states to protect foreign investments from harm against acts of the host state and its entities, as well as those of third parties.[78] While FPS is traditionally understood in terms of physical protection and security,[79] this has been extended on occasion to include non-physical protection,[80] particularly when the treaty defines an ‘investment’ to include intangible assets[81] or fails to exclude non-physical protections.[82]
In recent times, tech companies face an increasing threat of cyberattacks that emanates from private hackers, as well as state-sponsored (or at least tolerated) outfits.[83] Against this backdrop, the FPS standard may become increasingly relevant in determining the extent of the host state’s obligations to protect the assets of tech companies against cyberattacks in the host state. While there is no award thus far that has considered the extent of a host state’s FPS obligation over intangible tech assets, it has been suggested that cyberattacks are no different from civil unrests in which an obligation to accord FPS has generally been upheld.[84] Holding that a host state is obliged to provide FPS to a tech asset could expose the state to an obligation to provide a stable and secure internet infrastructure as against cyberattacks[85] and to provide effective legal redress when these occur.[86]
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that there are two opposing schools of thoughts on the appropriate protections granted under the FPS standard. The law is far from settled on whether FPS can be accorded to intangible tech assets, and the extent of those due diligence obligations imposed on host state to prevent harm.
The ultimate goal is for the investor to receive compensation for the losses suffered as a result of the host state’s breaches of its substantive obligations.[87] Tribunals can order a range of remedies, with compensation (damages) being the most frequently awarded.[88] However, the unique features of some tech investments may complicate a tribunal’s consideration of remedies.
First, there are uncertainties with the valuation of tech investments in which the economic value has yet to crystallise. Taking the example of big data, discrete data points may not make sense unless accumulated with other data and read together as part of an overall model. In a scenario where an investor is seeking to challenge mandatory data transfers to the host states as an expropriation, it may not be able to readily assign an economic value to such assets in its claim.
Second, there are tech companies that are in their infancy but exhibit future high growth potential. Although tech claimants would only need to prove the quantum of their damages with ‘some’ and not absolute certainty, the unique nature of some businesses may render it difficult to show that their lost profits or future damages were not too speculative, uncertain or remote to be awarded by the tribunal.[89]
Third, the different ways in which a host state may breach its obligations to protect the foreign tech investment may also give rise to complications when analysing issues of causation and the investor’s contributory negligence. For example, the failure to provide FPS in a foreign cyberattack would raise issues surrounding whether vulnerabilities in the investor’s own servers served as a contributing cause.
We are now likely at the start of a new wave of ISDS claims in relation to government regulations and activities in the tech space. There are a number of uncertainties that should be considered by tech companies considering initiating arbitration, including:
In the above, we have only begun to scratch the surface as to the possibilities for, and implications of, tech disputes. Whether we are considering the commercial sphere (tech M&A and collaborations) or investor–state sphere, the common theme remains that arbitration can and will likely play a bigger role in helping parties to resolve such disputes.
We have, where relevant, highlighted some overall uncertainties and areas to watch. Moving forward, it is important for tech companies to continue to keep track of these developments that fundamentally affect the protections of their commercial assets.
* The authors further thank our interns Param Bhalero and Nataliia Kichuk for their research assistance rendered in preparing this article.
[1] Klaus Schwab, ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond’, World Economic Forum, 14 January 2016 (accessible at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/).
[2] Richard Summerfield, ‘What is driving the tech M&A boom?’, Financier Worldwide Magazine, June 2022 (accessible at https://www.financierworldwide.com/what-is-driving-the-tech-ma-boom#.Yt_E_HZByUk); GlobalData, ‘Mergers and Acquisitions Deals by Top Themes and Industries in Q2 2022 – Thematic Research’, 18 July 2019 (accessible at https://www.globaldata.com/store/report/m-and-a-deals-by-theme-and-sector-analysis/). As noted in the overview by GlobalData, the TMT sector continued to dominate in terms of both M&A deal value and volume, with 2,718 deals worth $342 billion recorded in Q2 2022. See also MergerMarket, ‘Deal Drivers: EMEA HY 2022’, p 4.
[3] James Bamford, Gerard Baynham, David Ernst, ‘Joint Ventures and Partnerships in a Downturn’, Harvard Business Review, September-October 2020 (accessible at https://hbr.org/2020/09/joint-ventures-and-partnerships-in-a-downturn). While the authors were writing in the context of the impact of covid-19, their comments that JVs and partnerships can be a useful vehicle for sharing costs, reducing capital and positioning for future growth after a recession remain relevant today.
[4] Klaus Schwab, ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond’, World Economic Forum, 14 January 2016 (accessible at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/).
[5] By way of example, and following major legislative cornerstones such as the GDPR, the EU is currently seeing the Data Governance Act, the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act being adopted still in 2022, with proposals for a Data Act and an AI Act already on the table. For more information, see European Commission, ‘The Digital Services Act package’, Policies, 5 July 2022 (accessible at https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package) and European Commission, ‘A European Strategy for data’, Policies, 7 June 2022 (accessible at https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/strategy-data).
[6] See Sebastien Perry, ‘LCIA award upheld in med-tech dispute’, Global Arbitration Review, 14 April 2022 (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/lcia-award-upheld-in-med-tech-dispute); Cosmo Sanderson, ‘Janssen secures win in cancer drug royalties dispute’, Global Arbitration Review, 8 April 2022 (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/janssen-secures-win-in-cancer-drug-royalties-dispute).
[7] The ICC Case Information database collates information in ICC cases registered as of 1 January 2020 in relation to the sector of the industry and counsel representing the parties. Based on these two elements, we have identified six potential cases involving the telecommunications and IT industries that could involve European parties (Cases ID 01531, 01563, 01577, 01679, 01873, 02011). As the identity of the parties are confidential, we have used the law firms that they have chosen to retain as a proxy for determining the nexus of the dispute to Europe.
[8] International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), ‘The ICSID Caseload Statistics – Issue 2022-2’, pp 12, 25 (accessible at https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_ICSID_Caseload_Statistics_2022-2_ENG.pdf), which notes that 7 per cent of its cases registered from 1966 to 2021 involved the information and communications sector. Nonetheless, a review of ICSID’s earlier caseload statistics show that there has been a general rise in the percentage of tech disputes comprising ICSID’s annual case load in recent years, with tech disputes making up 10 per cent of ICSID’s newly registered cases in 2022 (thus far, at the time of writing), 11 per cent in 2021, 12 per cent in 2020, and 5 per cent in 2019.
[9] Earlier in 2016 and 2017, two surveys suggested that there was growing receptiveness to the use of arbitration to resolve tech disputes. See Queen Mary University of London, ‘Pre-empting and Resolving Technology, Media and Telecoms Disputes International Dispute Resolution Survey’, November 2016, p 25, which suggests that 92 per cent of surveyed tech companies were in support of the use of arbitration. See also Gary Benton, Chris Compton and Les Schiefelbein, ‘Cost is the Top Tech Litigation Problem, Survey Shows Arbitration Strongly Preferred for Specialized Expertise’, Silicon Valley Arbitration & Mediation Center, 2017, p 2 (accessible at https://svamc.org/wp-content/uploads/SVAMC-2017-Survey-Report.pdf).
[10] ibid.
[11] See, for instance, Marike R. P. Paulsson, ‘The Blockchain ADR: Bringing International Arbitration to the New Age’, 9 October 2018 (accessible at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/10/09/blockchain-adr-bringing-international-arbitration-new-age/).
[12] See Queen Mary University of London, ‘Pre-empting and Resolving Technology, Media and Telecoms Disputes International Dispute Resolution Survey’, November 2016, p 7, which notes that arbitration was most preferred as the type of dispute resolution mechanism, although litigation was most frequently used by parties.
[13] Collaborations are also sometimes referred to as ‘contractual JVs’.
[14] Klaus Schwab, ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond’, World Economic Forum, 14 January 2016 (accessible at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/).
[15] Gary L. Benton, Steven K. Andersen, ‘Technology Arbitration Revisited’, Dispute Resolution Journal, July 2020, Volume 74, No. 4, pp 1-25 (accessible at https://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/Benton% 20and%20Andersen%20-%20Technology%20Arbitration%20Revisited.pdf).
[16] Heiko Ziehms, Anna Baird, ‘A Record-Breaking Year in M&A: The Consequences for Damages in Post-M&A Dispute Resolution in Arbitration’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 16 June 2022 (accessible at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2022/06/16/a-record-breaking-year-in-ma-the-consequences-for-damages-in-post-ma-dispute-resolution-in-arbitration/).
[17] Heiko Ziehms, Anna Baird, ‘A Record-Breaking Year in M&A: The Consequences for Damages in Post-M&A Dispute Resolution in Arbitration’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 16 June 2022 (accessible at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2022/06/16/a-record-breaking-year-in-ma-the-consequences-for-damages-in-post-ma-dispute-resolution-in-arbitration/).
[18] MergerMarket, ‘Deal Drivers: EMEA HY 2022’, p 4 noting that TMT sector was expected to deliver the highest M&A volume over the remainder of 2022 compared to other sectors in EMEA.
[19] Heiko Ziehms, Anna Baird, ‘A Record-Breaking Year in M&A: The Consequences for Damages in Post-M&A Dispute Resolution in Arbitration’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 16 June 2022 (accessible at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2022/06/16/a-record-breaking-year-in-ma-the-consequences-for-damages-in-post-ma-dispute-resolution-in-arbitration/).
[20] Gary L. Benton, Steven K. Andersen, ‘Technology Arbitration Revisited’, Dispute Resolution Journal, July 2020, Volume 74, No. 4, pp 1-25 (accessible at https://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/Benton% 20and%20Andersen%20-%20Technology%20Arbitration%20Revisited.pdf).
[21] See Queen Mary University of London, ‘Pre-empting and Resolving Technology, Media and Telecoms Disputes International Dispute Resolution Survey’, November 2016, p 7, which summarises the attractive features of international arbitration for TMT disputes as according to the respondents to the survey from the TMT sector. See also Gary Benton, Chris Compton and Les Schiefelbein, ‘Cost is the Top Tech Litigation Problem, Survey Shows Arbitration Strongly Preferred for Specialized Expertise’, Silicon Valley Arbitration & Mediation Center (2017) (accessible at https://svamc.org/wp-content/uploads/SVAMC-2017-Survey-Report.pdf), p 2.
[22] Nasser Ali Khasawneh, Maria Mazzawi and Ricardo Christie, ‘Arbitration and the Advent of New Technologies’, Global Arbitration Review, 29 July 2022 (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-telecoms-arbitrations/first-edition/article/arbitration-and-the-advent-of-new-technologies).
[23] See Queen Mary University of London, ‘2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration as a System’, pp 3, 27, 28, which suggests that confidentiality is of importance and should be an opt-out rather than opt-in feature.
[24] Lucy Greenwood, ‘A New York Convention Primer’, ABA Dispute Resolution Magazine, 12 September 2019 (accessible at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/2019/summer-2019-new-york-convention/summer-2019-ny-convention-primer/).
[25] See Emily Hay, ‘Issues of Arbitrability in Telecoms Arbitrations’, Global Arbitration Review, 29 July 2022 (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-telecoms-arbitrations/first-edition/article/issues-of-arbitrability-in-telecoms-arbitrations).
[26] See Emily Hay, ‘Issues of Arbitrability in Telecoms Arbitrations’, Global Arbitration Review, 29 July 2022 (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-telecoms-arbitrations/first-edition/article/issues-of-arbitrability-in-telecoms-arbitrations).
[27] See Kai Schumacher and Christoph Wilmsmeier, ‘Valuation Approaches in Telecoms Arbitrations: Commercial Arbitrations’, Global Arbitration Review, 29 July 2022 discussing several valuation methods (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-telecoms-arbitrations/first-edition/article/valuation-approaches-in-telecoms-arbitrations-commercial-arbitrations).
[28] Heiko Ziehms, Anna Baird, ‘A Record-Breaking Year in M&A: The Consequences for Damages in Post-M&A Dispute Resolution in Arbitration’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 16 June 2022 (accessible at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2022/06/16/a-record-breaking-year-in-ma-the-consequences-for-damages-in-post-ma-dispute-resolution-in-arbitration/).
[29] This is true even in cases where W&I insurance is procured, given that such insurances typically do not cover risks that cannot properly assessed in a due diligence or risks such as freedom to operate, conflicting third party IP rights or open-source software risks.
[30] For a brief overview on issues to watch out for in respect of commercial collaborations, see Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ‘Tech transactions – The secrets of successful corporate collaboration’ (accessible at https://www.freshfields.de/our-thinking/campaigns/technology-quotient/tech-transactions/corporate-collaboration).
[31] Indeed, a 2022 list of top 10 innovative JVs reference at least six tech-related collaborations. See David Lidsky, ‘The 10 most innovative joint ventures in 2022’, Fast Company, 3 August 2022 (accessible at https://www.fastcompany.com/90724420/most-innovative-companies-joint-ventures-2022).
[32] See Zachary Shahan, ‘Can Argo.AI Make Ford & Volkswagen Self-Driving Leaders?’, CleanTechnica, 5 July 2020 (accessible at https://cleantechnica.com/2020/07/05/can-argo-ai-make-ford-volkswagen-self-driving-leaders/); Patrik Fiegl, ‘TTTech Auto and ZettaScale start collaboration on DDS network protocol’, TTTech Auto (accessible at https://www.tttech-auto.com/software-defined-vehicle-dds-network-protocol); Dana Hull, ‘Aurora Partners With Toyota in Bid to Bring Autonomy to Masses’, Bloomberg, 9 February 2021 (accessible at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-09/toyota-autonomous-vehicle-startup-aurora-enter-self-driving-cars-partnership); Zachary Shahan, ‘Mobileye’s Partnerships With BMW, Ford, NIO, Nissan, Volkswagen, & WILLER’, CleanTechnica, 10 August 2020 (accessible at https://cleantechnica.com/2020/08/10/mobileyes-partnerships-with-bmw-ford-nio-nissan-volkswagen-willer); Steven Merkt, ‘Supplier-OEM Partnerships Are Accelerating EV Innovation’, TE Connectivity (accessible at https://www.te.com/usa-en/about-te/perspectives-on-technology/supplier-oem-partnerships-electric-vehicle-innovation.html).
[33] See Gammon Construction and Guildhawk’s commercial collaboration reported in ‘Joint venture to create smart cities of the future’, PBC Today, 29 June 2021 (accessible at https://www.pbctoday.co.uk/news/digital-construction/smart-cities/built-environment-smart-cities/95341/); Oriental Pearl and China Electronics Technology Group’s commercial collaboration reported in ‘Joint venture to boost smart city development, Shine, 27 August 2020 (accessible at https://www.shine.cn/biz/economy/2008275015/).
[34] See Global Data, ‘Global IoT market will surpass the $1 trillion mark by 2024, says GlobalData’, 2 June 2021 (accessible at https://cio.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/internet-of-things/global-iot-market-to-surpass-1-trillion-mark-by-2024-globaldata/83194328?redirect=1).
[35] See Jack Ballantyne, ‘Nigerian oil trader seeks injunction against Ivorian state entity’, Global Arbitration Review, 27 August 2021 (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/nigerian-oil-trader-seeks-injunction-against-ivorian-state-entity).
[36] A typical issue is compliance with data protection and privacy regulations, also in relation to international data transfers. In this respect, the level of compliance required under the applicable laws is, to some extent, subject to interpretation.
[37] Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act) dated 23 February 2022, COM(2022) 68 final.
[38] For instance in the arbitration (1) MedImpact International LLC; (2) MedImpact International HK Limited v (1) Dimensions Healthcare LLC; (2) MedImpact Arabia Limited, DIFC-LCIA Case No. DL18141, para 18 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-1-medimpact-international-llc-and-medimpact-international-hk-limited-1-v-dimensions-healthcare-llc-and-2-medimpact-arabia-limited-final-award-wednesday-24th-july-2019#decision_14685), the claimants’ allegations included inter alia that (1) the respondents had sold IT services and software in the territory other than through the JV, which therefore interfered with the business of the JV; and (2) the respondents had breached contractual provisions surrounding the use of licensed IT and confidential information under the JV agreement and misappropriated IP rights.
[39] See CIETAC caseload statistics for 2014 to 2016 where JV disputes take up only around 1-8 per cent of its annual caseload (accessible at www.cietac-eu.org); Stockholm Chamber of Commerce caseload statistics for 2017 to 2019 where JV disputes take up around 5 per cent of its annual caseload (accessible at https://sccinstitute.com/statistics/statistics-2008-2020/).
[40] In the publicly reported examples that we came across, some examples involved a termination of the collaboration. See Artilium Africam LLC and Tristar Africa Telecon, LLC v Artilium Group Limited, Green Globe Services, LLC and Parateum Corporation, ICDR Case No. 01-19-0003-1680 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-artilium-africa-llc-et-al-v-artilium-plc-et-al-final-award-tuesday-8th-february-2022#decision_21716); (1) MedImpact International LLC; (2) MedImpact International HK Limited v (1) Dimensions Healthcare LLC; (2) MedImpact Arabia Limited, DIFC-LCIA Case No. DL18141 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-1-medimpact-international-llc-and-medimpact-international-hk-limited-1-v-dimensions-healthcare-llc-and-2-medimpact-arabia-limited-final-award-wednesday-24th-july-2019#decision_14685). See also the HKIAC arbitration between Proton Holdings and Goldstar Heavy Industrial reported by Cosmo Sanderson, ‘Malaysian carmaker declares win in dispute over Chinese venture’, Global Arbitration Review, 9 March 2022 (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/toys-r-us-in-battle-over-asian-joint-venture).
[41] Bruce Shneier, ‘We must bridge the gap between technology and policymaking. Our future depends on it’, World Economic Forum, 12 November 2019 (accessible at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/11/we-must-bridge-the-gap-between-technology-and-policy-our-future-depends-on-it).
[42] Sean Keane, ‘Trump reiterates Huawei as ‘national security threat’, CNET, 19 August 2019 (accessible at https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/trump-says-he-doesnt-want-to-do-business-with-huawei-due-to-national-security-threat); Annabel Murphy, Jack Parrock, ‘Huawei 5G: European countries playing ‘politics’ with network bans, Chinese company says’, Euronews, 28 July 2021 (accessible at https://www.euronews.com/next/2021/07/28/huawei-eyes-a-place-within-europe-s-digital-future-despite-5g-bans-in-some-countries).
[43] Aaron Gregg, ‘FCC commissioner calls on Google and Apple to ban TikTok app’, The Washington Post, 29 June 2022 (accessible at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/06/29/fcc-tiktok-ban-apple-google).
[44] Pjotr Sauer, ‘Russia bans Facebook and Instagram under ‘extremism’ law’, The Guardian, 21 March 2022 (accessible at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/21/russia-bans-facebook-and-instagram-under-extremism-law).
[45] Nivell Rayda, ‘CNA Explains: What do Indonesia’s new licensing rules mean for tech companies?’, 27 July 2022 (accessible at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-tech-companies-licensing-regulation-facebook-google-twitter-2838886); Digital Rights Monitor, ‘Social Media Companies instructed to establish local presence, provide government with unencrypted user data and block access to reported content within 24 hours’, 12 February 2020 (accessible at https://digitalrightsmonitor.pk/social-media-companies-instructed-to-establish-local-presence-provide-government-with-unencrypted-user-data-and-block-access-to-reported-content-within-24-hours).
[46] Lauren Feiner, ‘Uber to end service in Colombia after regulatory crackdown’, CNBC, 10 January 2020 (accessible at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/10/uber-to-end-service-in-colombia-after-regulatory-crackdown.html).
[47] Lluis Paradell, Santiago Gatica, ‘ISDS landscape in Latin America for 2022’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 19 April 2022 (accessible at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2022/04/19/isds-landscape-in-latin-america-for-2022/).
[48] Lisa Bohmer, ‘China’s Huawei lodges ICSID arbitration against Sweden over 5G ban’, IA Reporter, 24 January 2022 (accessible at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/chinas-huawei-lodges-icsid-arbitration-against-sweden-over-5g-ban/).
[49] Lisa Bohmer and Luke Peterson, ‘Uber threatens Colombia with treaty-based arbitration after ban on use of its ride-sharing app’, IA Reporter, 9 January 2020 (accessible at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/uber-threatens-colombia-with-treaty-based-arbitration-after-ban-on-use-of-its-ride-sharing-app/).
[50] Jack Ballantyne, ‘Chinese-Saudi telecoms dispute kicks off at ICSID’, Global Arbitration Review, 27 July 2022 (accessible at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/chinese-saudi-telecoms-dispute-kicks-icsid).
[51] Kevin Pinner, ‘Co. Hit By $100M Papua New Guinea Tax Seeks Arbitration’, Law360, 7 July 2022.
[52] L1bero Partners LP and Mr. Fabio M. Covarrubias Piffer v United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent, 30 December 2020 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/other/en-l1bero-partners-lp-and-mr-fabio-m-covarrubias-piffer-v-united-mexican-states-notice-of-intent-wednesday-30th-december-2020).
[53] Neustar, Inc. v Republic of Colombia (ICSID Case No. ARB/20/7), Notice of Intent, 13 September 2019 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/other/en-neustar-inc-v-republic-of-colombia-notice-of-intent-friday-13th-september-2019); Lisa Bohmer, ‘US-based operator of .co internet domain threatens to initiate ICSID arbitration against Colombia’, IA Reporter, 30 September 2019 (accessible at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/us-based-operator-of-co-internet-domain-threatens-to-initiate-icsid-arbitration-against-colombia).
[54] Article 1(a), Netherlands Model Investment Agreement (2019); Article 1(d)-(e), German Model BIT (2008); Article 1(1)(f), South Korea-Cameroon BIT (2013); Article 1(1)(iv), India-United Arab Emirates BIT (2013); Article 8.1(g) of the 2016 EU-CETA also expressly protects IP rights.
[55] Article 1(1), Turkey-China BIT (2015); Article 1(1), Switzerland-China BIT (2009).
[56] Kiran Bhageshpur, ‘Data Is The New Oil – And That’s A Good Thing’, Forbes Technology Council, 15 November 2019 (accessible at https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/11/15/data-is-the-new-oil-and-thats-a-good-thing/?sh=bece28173045).
[57] UNCTAD, ‘IIA Issues Note – Recent Developments in the International Investment Regime – Issue 1’, May 2018, p 2 (accessible at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaepcbinf2018d1_en.pdf).
[58] Matthias Hofer, Lutz Riede Tobias Timmann, ‘IP Trends in 2022 – AI and IP: A quick guide – Part I’, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 21 April 2022 (accessible at https://technologyquotient.freshfields.com/post/102hn1x/ip-trends-in-2022-ai-and-ip-a-quick-guide-part-i).
[59] UK Law Commission, ‘Digital Assets: Consultation Paper’, 28 July 2022, para 5.10 (accessible at https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2022/07/Digital-Assets-Consultation-Paper-Law-Commission-1.pdf). The Law Commission has proposed to recognise a third category of personal property known as ‘data objects’ which would: (1) compose of data represented in an electronic medium, including in the form of computer code, electronic, digital or analogue signals; (2) exist independently of persons and legal systems; and (3) be rivalrous.
[60] European Commission, ‘Free flow of non-personal data’, Policies (accessible at https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/non-personal-data).
European Commission, ‘Data Act: Commission proposes measures for a fair and innovative data economy’, Press Release, 23 February 2022 (accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1113).
[61] See Introduction and footnote 5 for the recent EU regulations affecting tech companies.
[62] Peter Chrocziel, Boris Kasolowsky and Robert Whitener, International Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes: A Practitioner’s Guide, CH Beck Hart Nomos (2017), para 74.
[63] UNCTAD Study, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking’, 31 January 2017, pp 47-52 (accessible at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/iteiia20065_en.pdf).
[64] Christopher F. Duggan, Don Wallace, Jr., Noah D. Rubins, Borzu Sabahi, ‘Expropriation’, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008), p 451.
[65] The cases of CME v Czech Republic and Lauder v Czech Republic involved parallel claims alleging the state’s expropriation of the investor’s exclusive broadcasting licence. Notwithstanding that there was no direct taking, CME succeeded in showing that there was indirect expropriation because the state’s alteration of the exclusive licence made it impossible to continue its broadcasting operations. A different conclusion was reached in Lauder v Czech Republic however on the issue of indirect expropriation among others. See Lisa Bohmer, ‘Looking Back (2 of 3): On the Merits: Two Different UNCITRAL Tribunals Reached Opposite Results in Dispute over Czech Media Investment’, IA Reporter, 10 April 2019 (accessible at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/looking-back-2-of-3-on-the-merits-two-different-uncitral-tribunals-reached-opposite-results-in-dispute-over-czech-media-investment/). See also Christopher F. Duggan, Don Wallace, Jr., Noah D. Rubins, Borzu Sabahi, ‘Expropriation’, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp 457-461 noting the debate and variations in awards adopting the two different standards of substantial or complete deprivation of rights.
[66] See the US’ call for a ban on TikTok and Russia’s ban on social media companies previously mentioned above.
[67] See Indonesia’s and Pakistan’s data sharing requirements previously mentioned above.
[68] See footnote 65. See also Christopher F. Duggan, Don Wallace, Jr., Noah D. Rubins, Borzu Sabahi, ‘Expropriation’, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp 457-461 noting the debate and variations in awards adopting the two different standards of substantial or complete deprivation of rights in finding an expropriation.
[69] At the time of writing, there are currently two cases challenging the ban on the use of a tech company’s software application, which are Espíritu Santo Holdings, LP and L1bre Holding, LLC v United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB/20/13) which is brought under NAFTA and Uber Technologies Inc and Uber Colombia S.A.S v Colombia. In the first case, the claimants do not appear to have argued that their ‘investment’ relates to the IP rights and other intangible property rights protected under NAFTA. Instead, the claimants argue that their ‘investment’ is the shares in the local company and concession agreement granted by the state. See the claimant’s notice of intent for Espíritu Santo Holdings, LP and L1bre Holding, LLC v United Mexican States, 30 May 2019 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/other/en-espiritu-santo-holdings-lp-v-united-mexican-states-notice-of-intent-thursday-30th-may-2019). In the second case, we refer to the notice of dispute which refers to Uber’s protected investments as including IP rights over the Uber Platform and applications. See Uber’s notice of dispute under the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, 30 December 2019 (accessible at https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw11118.pdf).
[70] These are the cases involving Huawei, Uber, Neustar and L1bero Partners. The remaining cases involving PCCW and Digicel could not be verified because their notices of intent or requests for arbitration have not been publicised.
[71] Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v the Kingdom of Sweden, Request for Arbitration, 7 January 2022 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/other/en-huawei-technologies-co-ltd-v-kingdom-of-sweden-request-for-arbitration-friday-7th-january-2022); Neustar Inc and Co Internet SAS v The Republic of Colombia, Request for Arbitration, 23 December 2019 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/other/en-neustar-inc-v-republic-of-colombia-request-for-arbitration-monday-23rd-december-2019).
[72] Espíritu Santo Holdings, LP and L1bre Holding, LLC v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/13, Claimants’ Notice of Intent, 30 May 2019 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/other/en-espiritu-santo-holdings-lp-v-united-mexican-states-notice-of-intent-thursday-30th-may-2019).
[73] Espíritu Santo Holdings, LP and L1bre Holding, LLC v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/13, Claimants’ Notice of Intent, 30 May 2019 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/other/en-espiritu-santo-holdings-lp-v-united-mexican-states-notice-of-intent-thursday-30th-may-2019).
[74] See Uber’s Notice of Dispute under the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, 30 December 2019 (accessible at https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw11118.pdf).
[75] Daniel Malan, ‘The law can’t keep up with new tech. Here’s how to close the gap’, World Economic Forum, 21 June 2018 (accessible at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/law-too-slow-for-new-tech-how-keep-up/).
[76] Prabhash Ranjan, Harsha Vardhana Singh, Kevin James and Ramandeep Singh, ‘India’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Is India Too Risk Averse?’, Brookings India Impact Series, August 2018, pp 24-25. The 2016 India Model BIT does not contain a specific fair and equitable treatment clause, and instead refers to the protection for the treatment of investments under customary international law.
[77] Matthew C. Porterfield, ‘A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair and Equitable Treatment under Customary International Law by Investment Tribunals’, International Institute for Sustainable Development Investment Treaty News, 22 March 2013 (accessible at https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-difference-the-interpretation-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-under-customary-international-law-by-investment-tribunals/#_ftn2); Chapter 11, Article 6(2)(c) of the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, 27 February 2009 (accessible at https://aanzfta.asean.org/uploads/2016/09/AANZFTA-legal-text-PRINTED-Signed.pdf); NAFTA Free Trade Commission, North American Free Trade Agreement Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 July 2001 (accessible at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/commission/ch11understanding_e.asp).
[78] Christopher F. Duggan, Don Wallace, Jr., Noah D. Rubins, Borzu Sabahi, ‘Full Protection and Security’, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp 533-535; Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), p 149.
[79] Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic (PCA Case No. 2001-04), Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para 484 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/fr/document/decision/en-saluka-investments-bv-v-the-czech-republic-partial-award-friday-17th-march-2006).
[80] Christopher F. Duggan, Don Wallace, Jr., Noah D. Rubins, Borzu Sabahi, ‘Full Protection and Security’, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 538; CME v Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 13 September 2001, para 613 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-cme-czech-republic-b-v-v-the-czech-republic-partial-award-thursday-13th-september-2001); Azurix Corp v The Argentine Republic (I) (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), Award, 14 July 2006, para 408 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/fr/document/decision/en-azurix-corp-v-the-argentine-republic-i-award-friday-14th-july-2006); Siemens A.G. v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8), Award, 6 February 2007, para 303 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-siemens-a-g-v-the-argentine-republic-award-wednesday-17th-january-2007).
[81] See for instance Siemens A.G. v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8), Award, 6 February 2007, para 303. The Tribunal also based its reasoning on the qualification of the term ‘security’ as ‘legal security’ under the treaty.
[82] Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3), Award, 20 August 2007, paras 7.4.15-7.4.17 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-compania-de-aguas-del-aconquija-s-a-and-vivendi-universal-s-a-formerly-compania-de-aguas-del-aconquija-s-a-and-compagnie-generale-des-eaux-v-argentine-republic-i-award-ii-monday-20th-august-2007); Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), Award, 24 July 2008, para 729 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-biwater-gauff-tanzania-limited-v-united-republic-of-tanzania-award-thursday-24th-july-2008).
[83] Jerry Dunleavy, ‘‘Blended Threat’: DOJ warns of China, Russia, and North Korea allying with hackers, Justice Department’, The Washington Examiner, 19 February 2022 (accessible at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/justice/doj-warns-china-russia-north-korea-criminal-hackers-blended-threat).
[84] David Collins, ‘Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of International Investment Law to Digital Assets’, The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 2011, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 225-243.
[85] David Collins, ‘Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of International Investment Law to Digital Assets’, The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 2011, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 236-237.
[86] David Collins, ‘Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of International Investment Law to Digital Assets’, The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 2011, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 239-240.
[87] Christopher F. Duggan, Don Wallace, Jr., Noah D. Rubins, Borzu Sabahi, ‘Full Protection and Security’, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008), p 567; Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Poland v Germany), PCIJ Series A. No 17, Judgement, 13 September 1928, p 47.
[88] Christopher F. Duggan, Don Wallace, Jr., Noah D. Rubins, Borzu Sabahi, ‘Damages, Compensation and Non-Pecuniary Remedies’, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp 567-572.
[89] See for instance in Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and on Principles of Quantum, 22 May 2012, paras 437-439 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-mobil-investments-canada-inc-and-murphy-oil-corporation-v-government-of-canada-i-decision-on-liability-and-principles-of-quantum-tuesday-22nd-may-2012); Gemplus S.A., SLP, S.A., and Gemplus Industrial, S.A. de C.V. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/3 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, 16 June 2010, para 49 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-gemplus-s-a-slp-s-a-and-gemplus-industrial-s-a-de-c-v-v-united-mexican-states-award-wednesday-16th-june-2010); SoIEs Badajoz GmbH v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/38, Award, 31 July 2019, para 478 (accessible at https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-soles-badajoz-gmbh-v-kingdom-of-spain-none-currently-available-monday-24th-august-2015#decision_4127).
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